Globalization as Will and Idea: Part I
Cosmopolitanism, globalizing elites and intellectual discourses

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Introduction

Is anthropology a "cosmopolitan" discipline. Of course in one sense: Its subject matter is the totality of societies and cultures of the world so it can be said to encompass the world's diversity. On the other hand the purpose of this encompassment is not necessarily to embrace cosmopolitan values i.e. the encompassment of the totality of this diversity as an identity. But this has become the case for a number of anthropologists and the subject of this discussion is to analyze the background of this development. Cosmopolitan identity has become popular (again) and I shall be arguing that this is itself a historical conjunctural phenomenon which is significantly broader than can be understood in terms of theoretical development or the history of ideas and which is rooted in the historical transformation of the global system that we inhabit.

There are different kinds of cosmopolitanism that have been discussed in the literature. One can use the word as one desires and find cosmopolitans everywhere if one wishes to do so and it is this very wish, its emergence, that is worthy of study in the contemporary situation. There are several usages current in the past few years:

Three figures of cosmopolitanism

1. Modernist cosmopolitanism: Internationalist cosmpolitanism, both liberal and socialist are not at all about diversity, nor even about culture as such. They are about the universal and are linked to a set of goals for the entire world. This is modernist cosmopolitanism. It identifies as modernist and oriented to the transformation of the social world on a global scale. It has been the dominant form of cosmopolitanism at least since the late 18th century among the French encyclopedists (not all) in the work of Kant, Marx and so many others. It is also prominent among todays universalists, not least those concerned with human rights. This category corresponds to Calhoun's extreme cosmopolitanism (2003), extreme in the sense that it is based on a universalist value set that claims to transcend any particular cultural frame. This is usually expressed in moral terms, as in the cosmopolitanism espoused by Nussbaum (...).

2. Cultural cosmopolitanism This apparently postmodern variant is entirely culturalist in its practice of identification with diversity and with the appropriation of the latter within a particular identity. This is the emergent dominant form of cosmopolitanism today, but it has a long history that has by and large not contended for ideological dominance the way it is being offered to us now. Its point of departure is cultural identity as such, or at least particular cultures. Cosmopolitan is simply then the transcendence of one culture and the encompassment of the larger field of cultural differences within the purvey of the former. This requires a certain distance to the various cultures to which one refers oneself which entails a degree of reification and thus of the objectification of the individual as well who is external to the different cultures in which he may partake or more probably consume in the

form of objects, texts and even discrete experiences. Calhoun (op.cit) refers to this as moderate cosmopolitanism insofar as it does not posit a higher abstract level of being or of morality. However one might suggest that the mixture or act of encompassment of difference in itself reflects the same kind of superiority even if not based on a moral imperative. And it might be added that such imperatives can and do emerge, for example in the notion of the higher moral order of hybridity, inherently beyond tolerance because identified with all and embodying the best of the world a higher form of humanity. Calhoun discusses two variants of this, one which focuses exclusively on the individual's capacity to move between cultures and another that is more socio-centric, refering to the multicultural and interpenetrating world itself.

3. By extension of the above, there is more recently a discourse that claims cosmopolitan status for a great many populations that have not usually been considered for such a title. The above two cosmopolitanisms are associated with elites and with a certain consciousness of superiority with regard to the local, a transgression of boundaries, weaker among internationalists who are not terribly concerned with the nation or the local as anything other than either limits or even as building blocks of the inter-national, much stronger among cultural cosmopolitans who would truly see themselves as encompassing the world.   In anthropology this has developed into an interesting re-classification of migrant populations, or of the urban situation in general. I would argue that this very often contains a conflation of the emic and the etic. The cosmopolitan observer seeking to ferret out cosmopolitans simply labels certain people as citizens of the world primarily becuase they display certain characteristics, i.e. they can speak several languages and operate in several different cultural settings in the larger world.. This is all quite vague of course and can lead to the destruction of the original meaning of the word. What to do with the "tribal" societies of Upland Southeast Asia and Central Asia whose populations speak a dozen languages, who can easily adopt new cultural forms. The answer must lie in the way that they identify themselves and not in the way that we seek to classify them.   It is this conflation, in any case that has produced a new category of lower class or lumpen cosmopolitans whose identity is primarily the property of the observer. This is not to claim that such cosmopolitan identity cannot exist at the lower end of the social scale. It is to imply that we need to find out the way actors identify and not simply rely on our own observer based interpretations.

In order to begin to understand the varieties of cosmopolitan identity I seek in what follows to locate it within the category structure of Western state society where it is possible to argue for a significant continuity in cosmopolitan identity as part of a larger field of identification. The discussion below is meant to provide a step in the development of a broader understanding of the social foundations of cosmopolitan discourse.

Structures of the Long Run

Categories such as globalization, cosmopolitan elites, national elites, middle classes, immigrant minorities, regional minorities and indigenous populations are not categories that appear in a particular historical era. They are basic structural features of the capitalist state system, and more specifically the nation state system, although I would also stress that they have appeared numerous times in history as constituents of older global systems. Their salience may vary over time, but they exist, at least virtually, throughout the history of the

system. It might be argued that the nation form is a product of capitalist state organization. This is however a mere potential that depends for its realization upon a number of different processes some of which are strongly connected to the commodification of the social world within the state. The process by which local sodalities and institutions are dissolved by the joint action of the state and commercialization/capitalization and by which the individual is "liberated" from dependency upon lower order social relations to become dependent upon the wage relation, is a process that gradually empties the social space between the self and the state. This is a variable process that only approximates an ideal type in Nordic social democratic states which have, in the contemporary period, sought to sever all bonds that are not themselves state organized. Thus the family may be replaced by a string of socializing agencies, from day care to university at the same time as the wage labor-tax nexus becomes generalized to such an extent that the individual becomes totally independent, economically, on former social networks. Children can liberate themselves from their parents at a relatively early age by becoming clients of the state. At the same time collectivite institutions such as village, communal and regional governments have been systematically stripped of a great deal of their autonomy (a process that has recently been reversed to some degree, at least with respect to schooling and health). This is a process that has been described in terms of individualization and is associated with a principle characteristic of "modernity".   It is in a highly atomized social field that identification with the state can replace other collective identities, a process that need have nothing to do with national identity as such as is evidenced by the case of Sweden. The space is then filled with propositions about reality, about relations to nature, to destiny, to history. This, of course, can occur without the dissolution of lower level structures as has been proven throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The nation state form is not merely a relation between individualized subjects and a larger collectivity. It is also an organization that envelops and cuts across class relations. This is a complex affair with plenty of variation, but it is crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of interstate relations as well as the transformation that we have come to know as the welfare state.   As this is not an essay in history but in structure, I do not intend to delve into the variations of national identity within modern states. I shall focus on a single phenomenon, the relation of a self-defined people and the state as the focal point for a practice of self-identification, in either positive or negative terms, depending on the particular social position from which actors practice their identifications. Thus the fusion of state and people in Sweden earlier this century can be contrasted with what appears to be a radical opposition between nation and state in Australia (Kapferer). It has been argued that class struggle has been organized in terms of a We, a self-identified people, against capital, with or without the support of the state. In the historical memory of Australia the state is identified as a British colonial and penal institution and if the working class movement might seem to have penetrated the self-identity of that state, the division remains, just as the division between the white population and the Aborigines. In France too elites often feel the necessecity of representativity with respect to the people, but they nevertheless entertain an elite identity as a political class of the highly educated. There is a cosmology of failed sovereignty in France that legitimates taking the streets when the state fails in its duty toward its people.   There are also cases where the state has been "captured" by certain working class movements, at least ideologically transforming the former into an extension of peoplehood. Sweden is certainly a prime example of this, but it is to be noted that the fusion thus imposed has a curious past. The notion of "people's home" a society equivalent to a family is not an invention of the left but of the conservatives, a not uncommon variation on the paternalist ideology of the conservatives. This was assimilated into social democratic ideology and has played a crucial

role in national politics allowing elites to impose a total restructuring of working class lives, from racial hygiene to high-rise housing, in the name of a union of a national population under the aegis of a single social project. It is not then so extraordinary that the word society commonly substitutes for state in political and even everyday discourse. While the Swedish case is something of an extreme, the same parameters can be found in most nation states. The latter relate to the role of the state as an instrument of the people and to the need to pronounce broadly social goals that indicate the self-evident responsibility of the state with regard to the people's welfare. This ideology concerns the rights of the "the people" as well as the responsibility of capitalists. While there are clearly liberal interpretations of the nation state in which the market is said to ensure the welfare of all, it is necessary that the welfare of all is stressed, i.e. that the capitalists also wish the best for their workers. The good in this model is welfare itself, the wellbeing, well financed, of ordinary people. The taming of social elites is part of the process of national welfare development, the submission of all to a common project. The logic of this process of consolidation in which people and state become joined if not fused, generates the category of the "we", a "we the people". And this occurs under the umbrella of the territorial state itself. It is bounded and tends toward the assimilation or at least integration of differences within the larger identity of a societal project

It might well be argued that the nation state as such is no constant in the history of the modern world, but that a certain tendency in class formation has been more of a structure of the longue durée. Here I would like to suggest something along these lines, but the structure to which I refer is not a particular set of class categories. Instead it is a tendency to the distribution of positions with respect to local populations within the larger regional, or global, arena. This is a structure that distributes a number of categories with respect to one another, from interstate or cosmopolitan elite relations to localized relations to more restricted territories. I have previously represented the structure as in figure 1.

Figure 1 Cosmopolitanization and Indgenization in the nation state

The graphic representation here applies to a global arena organized into nation states, but the categories are similar in fundamental ways even in other state formations.

In earlier eras, for example, the state elites were at the same time cosmopolitan elites, as aristocrats that participated in an interstate realm in which royalties and aristocracies were joined in marriage and political alliances, in which they sent artisans, architects and artists from court to court in generous gestures. The variant of this structure at the turn of the last century might have looked as in figure 2:

Figure 2 Social categories of the Absolutist State

These states were not nation states in any sense. They were aristocratic/royal domains linked by marriage and political alliances as well as by conflict and warfare. Territorial populations were not integrated into the larger territory as a mass of individuals. Instead there were numerous regional and local political structures. Migration was certainly an integral part of the dynamics of such

states the product of royal policies and demands for specialized labor. But insofar as ordinary people were subjects rather than citizens they were essentially pawns in a larger set of strategies. National or ethnic identity was limited primarily to local groups and regions or to diasporic populations who resided in particular ethnic enclaves. And there was clearly identification with larger units on the part of warriors and those who could gain by becoming attached to royal courts. What is important for this discussion is the continuum from the local to the interstate level and the potential oppositions that developed among them. However, it should be clearly noted that the very praxis of the absolutist state created a social field of national identity. Long before the French Revolution there were letters of "naturalisation" offered to foreigners who came to live in the country. This was a hotly debated issue surrounding the imposition of taxes on foreigners in 1697.   There was a great deal of migration and aristocratic tourism following the war against the Augsburg coalition. As one contemporary described it,

> "Depuis que la paix était faite, il y avait eu dans Paris un si grand abord d'étrangers que l'on en comptait quinze à seize mille dans le faubourg Saint-Germain seulement....au commencement de l'année suivante, on trouva qu'il y en avait trente-six mille dans ce seul faubourg" (*Annales de la Cour de la Ville*, 1697-98, in Dubost and Sahlins 1999: 15)

And the word "nation" is used to identify individuals throughout the period, terms such as:

Anne Sauvage, 'anglaise de nation' (378).. described as "pas mariée en France, qu'elle ne suit pas la coutume de Paris et qu'elle n'est pas naturalisée" (Dubost and Sahlins 378)

Jacques Lieurard, a protestant convert from the North of France wrongly taxed as 'fils d'un étranger originaire de Hollande' (op.cit 379)

'Francais imparfaits' (380)

Immigrant status was also inherited for three generations for those arriving after 1600, that is, it was defined in terms of descent from specific national origins. The author Fénélon expresses in his *Aventures de Télémaque* a clear opposition to what he associates to the urban, commercial, foreign merchants and the international from a position that can be interpreted as Christian and agrarian (op. cit. 391). There is a twofold set of representations generated in this division between the peasant and the urban sectors of the larger territory. The latter insists on the royal strategy of the state elites to increase their economic base, demographically and in capital, the former on an increasingly salient notion of a national population, sedentary and exploited by the latter. It might be suggested that this growing opposition is the foundation for the French Revolution in which "peoplehood" is established as a sovereign body within the confines of the territorial state, thus creating the nation state. As the Abbé de Sieyès stated the case, it is the sovereign people and not the king that incarnates the nation., the "Third Estate" is a,

> "Corps d'associés vivant sous une loi commune et représentés par le même législateur" (Sieyès 1789 in Noiriel 2001:89)

It is noteworthy that there is a notion of the larger world in opposition to the local and the parochial that appears as a historical invariant. This is more clearly expressed in the elite

sector than in the popular sector. It accounts for the early appearance of religious doctrines that are clearly global in scope. In the early 17th century there are fairly clear expressions of a notion of a single humanity and of the need for the establishment of a world order, not, in fact, foreign to the Catholic Church's interpretation. The Rosicrucians published in 1614 a pamphlet entitled *Fama*. In that pamphlet it is proposed that all learned men throughout the world should join forces towards the establishment of a synthesis of science. Behind this effort allegedly stood an illuminated brotherhood - the children of light, who had been initiated in the mysteries of the Grand Order. This "Brüderschaft der Theosophen" was said to be founded by Christian Rosencreutz (1378-1484), who had become an initiate during his travels in the Middle East in the Fifteenth century. He founded a brotherhood which was supposed to have operated in secret ever since.

Now it is somewhat less clear to what extent there were indigenizing or nationalizing tendencies in the early history of Europe, but it is widely accepted that the nation state was very much a project of state oriented elites with the caveat that the latter produced an opposing project rooted in the exploited classes to capture the state and make it an instrument in the service of its own needs. The various regional and local resistances that proliferated within emerging absolutist states are evidence that there were and are numerous sub-state identities of varying strength right up into the present. It is necessary to find the resonance bases for the different collective identifications that characterize our history so as to avoid falling into the trap of envisioning such identities as mere intellectual constructs that people have somehow been seduced into accepting.

The cosmopolitanism of certain elites is apparently a well established European habitus or even tradition. This is clearly evident in the history of the Free Masonry. The latter, after being taken over by aristocrats and then wealthy capitalists clearly expressed a set of values that are equally visible in today's world. Thus the new age managerialism that is so common in the contemporary world of elites has its more aristocratic forerunners in the Freemasonry of the past. These themes can be outlined as follows:

1. An opposition to organized religion in its Western form
2. An attraction to Oriental religious philosophy, not least its holism
3. An interest in primitive and ancient religions
4. The individual as the center of spirituality and a direct link to the sacred or godhead, understood in pantheistic terms.
5. The superiority of the elect who can attain this relation to the sacred
6. In political terms, an orientation to the world as a whole, to Mankind.
    A. this implies opposition to the nation state or any other subnational units except as sources of spirituality
    B. the internal differentiation between leaders and followers, or the elect and the rest
7. In class terms this is the formation in ideological terms and identity terms of an international elite.
8. A millenaristic view of the future...the New Age which is to come.

These themes incorporate notions of holism and of being chosen by higher powers. The elite becomes the "chosen few", chosen to lead all of humanity to the promised land. It implies distance rather than identity with populations that are under its rule and this provides a link to the pluralism that is so prevalent in older and new versions of multiculturalism.

> "The cosmopolitan bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century came to adopt a
> perspective own society as if it were a foreign one a target for 'colonial'

exploitation. Freemasonry provided a cover for developing the new identity on which the exploitation of members of one's own community is premised. By entering the masonic lodges, merchants and those otherwise involved in thelong-distance money economy such as lawyers and accountants, realised the primordial alientation from the community which is the precondition for market relations, exploitation of wage labour, and abstract citizenship." (Ravenstock-Huessy (1961:364) in Van der Pijl 99)

Another aspect of this particular global position is its association with finance rather than industrial production, the former being associated with the cosmopolitan as opposed to industry which is vulgarly localized.

"By being expressly non-manual, divorced from actual labour, British masonry reproduced the aristocratic preference for arms-length control over direct entrepreneurial involvement. The English gentleman preferred 'to sit above the commercial fray, pulling levers, dangling rewards and applying sanctions (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1994: 321)

The logic connecting finance with the cosmopolitan is in turn with a sense of a higher power and even mission. The values of the humanism that emerged in the enlightenment are very much woven together with this particular version of cosmopolitanism.

The small worlds of cosmopolitanism

One of the outcomes of the continuity of the cosmopolitan elite as an invariant category of the modern state is the production of social worlds that are more or less bounded socially. Cosmopolitan identity commonly represents itself as world encompassing as opposed to the smaller worlds of national and other more localized populations. This is a significant misrepresentation of reality, one that confuses geographical with social closure. It has led to absurd assertions that, for example, diasporas are instances of cosmopolitan openness, a notion that flies in the face of practically all that is known of such transnational groups where boundaries must absolutely be maintained if the diaspora or transnational population is to survive, implying high levels of endosociality including endogamy and strict control over children. It is, in this respect, enlightening to investigate the life of transnational elites, which display some of the characteristics of diasporas. A recent study of what has been called *l'immigration dorée* in France (Wagner 1999) reveals a number of interesting properties of the social life that as developed in such transnational elites. Focussing on foreign elite communities via their relation to international schools and other associations, she depicts a two layered structure, one newer, the product of the recent emergence of a transnational managerial class and the other the old more aristocratic cosmopolitan elites. Although she has concentrated on a relatively limited time period, it appears that almost a third of all transnationals in her sample marry with other transnationals, though not necessarily of the same nationality. They send their children to a limited number or schools where a significant portion of education consists in learning to be international. They play at representing the world, at being a United Nations devoted to a celebration of cultural diversity and they often have official connections with these international organizations.   But they

also identify themselves in the idiom of blood, even where it is mixed.

> "j'ai le sang ex-patrié"....Je suis américain, de passeport et de nationalité mais ma famille et celle de ma femme aussi, ont un grand nombre de ramifications dans beaucoup de pays, ce qui fait qu'on a toujours eu en peid aux Ètats-Unis un peid à l'étranger" (Wagner 1999:116)

> "Mon père était un peu vagabond, et on avait ca dans les veines. Mes frères, c'est pareil: j'ai un frère en Autriche, un en Finlande, une soeur en Espagne. Mon père se déplacait beaucoup, et j'ai dû prendre ca." (op. cit. 116)

The very expression "ex-patriot blood" expresses a combination of roots and routes of the kind announced in much of the post-colonial cultural studies literature. The transnational is concretized in biological terms. The self definition of a cosmopolitan ethos which is common to both aristocratic and managerial groups is an essential part of their self-understanding.

> "La curiosité, l'ouverture, la tolérance sont des termes souvent employés pour désigner ces qualités" (142)

This is the ethos of the world traveler always open to new adventures, to new kinds of experience and to *different kinds* of people. But it should be noted that the actual social arenas of these cosmopolitans is limited to a number of associations, clubs and schools where they constantly meet and are able to identify one another by their common interests, tastes, but also differences regarding national origins and cultures.

There is also the expression of the opposition between themselves and the more "terrestrial" ordinary nationals. They are even referred to as *terrestrials* in some comments.

> "Alors le terriens, c'est quelqu'un qui a un espace limité. Son activité se concentre sur la terre qu'il possède. Si l'autre va sur sa terre, il ne l'acceptera pas. Il est attaché à sa famille, à ses enfants, qu'il veut garder chez lui, parce que sa famille cultive sa terre... L'Allemand est intustriel et commercial. Pour lui, le monde est grand...." (Op.cit 204)

And there is the opposition including the usual classification of the local "other"

> "Je crois que la classe populaire est plus attachée à ses origines. Les anglais en France sont plutôt des gens des classes moyennes. En Angleterre les classes populaires sont plus nationalistes que les autres, moins ouvertes." (op.cit. 189)

If the cosmopolitan is a perpetual structure in the modern territorial and nation state, it becomes increasingly salient in periods of globalization. One may even speak of an unstable opposition between the local, the national and the international in which ideological dominance shifts markedly over time.

At the very top of this hierarchy are the families that have been designated in France as the *grandes fortunes*. This group keeps its distance from the others, with its own clubs and

associations, listed and ranked in journals like *Le petit mondain*, in terms of their places of residence. (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 1996: 120).

> "Cosmopolitisme des relations muliterritorialité étendue aux pays étrangers ce sont là deux composantes essentielles de la haute société" in (op.cit 120)

Wagner presents the example of the comte de Chatel. His genealogy is mixed, Italy, England, Belgium, Argentina; marriages among various elites. The family's capital is directly linked to the family's international segmentary structure. M. de Chatel is never an ex-patriot when he travels. He is always on his own property somewhere in the world. But he is also a professional chameleon in cultural if not (certainly not) in class terms.

> "Oui on me prenait pour un Anglais en Angleterre, comme en Argentine on me prend pour un Argentin. C'est un des seuls dons que m'ait donné le bon Dieu. J'imite les accents avec énormément de facilités (*il imite l'accent marseillais)*. Ca ne sert pas a grand-chose, mais bon"! (Wagner 122)

The differentiation between the upper crust and the managers, besides being socially marked in very clear terms, is also a difference between a cosmopolitan identity in which an aristocratic world tends to be homogeneous and a more multinational world in which cultures are compared and ranked. This may be more of a variation than a true difference since there is a strong overlap in perspectives. But Wagner's findings suggest a difference in the two spheres.

> "Les deux formes de rapports à l'étranger restent néamoins bien distincts. *L'international* se définit aussi par opposition au *cosmopolite*. Le cosmopolitisme repose sur la cohésion d'une petite élite aristocratique, et ne met pas reellement en jeu des relations entre des cultures différentes. A l'inverse, la culture internationale des cadres repose justement sur la valorisation de la diversité des culture nationales." (212)

In both groups, however, there is a tendency toward a distancing to the local and the national and an identification with the international or transnational.

> "La capacité d'etre chez soi, au sens à la fois matériel, social et symbolique dans plusieurs pays, l'incorporation d'une identité cosmopolite qui produit ses effets sur toutes les dimensions de la personne définissent bien le modèle vers lequel tend la culture internationale des cadres." (212)

Cosmopolitanization and globalization

In the graphics above I suggest that there is a tendency to cosmopolitanization of elites in periods of strong globalization such as that which we we witness today. This can be understood as a product of the convergence of social and spatial mobility, one that situates its adherents "above" the world where they can encompass the diversity that lies below without being part of it except in the sense of being able to consume it in the form of products. This distinction creates an opposition to the local as something which is decidedly lower in status

while simultaneously conflating immobility with cultural poverty. It is a mistake then to assume that the encompassing self-representation of the cosmopolitan implies a real engagement with the world. Geographical movement, yes, but this is within a narrow sphere of class in which relations established are bounded and often highly segregated, in which identity is strong and homogenous with respect to status and position. The negation of social praxis in the self-identification of the cosmopolitan is a logical outcome of the nature of social position within this system. The generalization of cosmopolitanism to all domains of transnational connections appears in this light to express a kind of struggle for ideological hegemony, one that is primarily the work of those below the summit. It might be understood as an intellectual elaboration of the lower orders of the elite spheres which are in general the locus of production of dominant ideologies. The generalization of cosmopolitan identity is what tends to equate cosmopolitanism with globalization itself and to imply the evolution from local to global referred to above. Locals are not merely at the bottom of this process, they are also represented as precursors to the present. They are in this sense primitive, but in a way that conflates Freudian primitivity, libidinous and inhabiting all of us, with a temporal sense of being backward and the two are of course strongly associated. It is this which, ultimately, makes the local dangerous as in the French expression "classes dangereuses". Primitive culture, of course, is perfectly wonderful, but it needs to be extracted from its lived context and reified into objects that can be consumed without danger. The museological understanding of culture that has become increasingly popular in recent years expresses this sublimation or even displacement of the libinous of otherness into objects of consumption/contemplation and celebration. And, it is this transformation that enables diversity to be collected and displayed in the salons of the elites. This is also essential to the identification of such elites with diversity and multiculturalism. The strength of this ideology depends on the balance of forces within which it is produced.

Cosmopolitanism tends to emerge simultaneously with and in dialectical relation to localizing ideologies, with nationalism, and other regional identities. This is happening today just as it occurred in the previous period of globalization between 1870 and 1920. It is interesting to compare the two periods in this respect. It is worth noting here for those concerned with modern clan based states of the Third World, that Britain was ruled for a forty year period by a small congery of intermarried familes whose core was the Cecils, Lord Salisbury and his extended family and their kin and allies. Caroll Quigley's remarkable study whose publication he tried to prevent before his death, details the genealogical details of what appear to be no more than 8 families which on analysis reveal a high level of endogamy within the group and even several examples of bilateral cross-cousin marriage, classificatory of course! (See Garrigues 2004 for the analysis). These families who populate virtually all significant positions within the national and imperial government in The British Empire contains a core of cosmopolitanism that is quite central to developments later in the century. It is Cecil Rhodes and his *Society of the Elect* whose strategy was to set the agenda for the continued success of the Empire. The League of Nations, one of the most significant international developments of this period may well have been conceived by this group as was the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth. One of the members of this group, Lord Alfred Milner, pivotal player in the British cosmopolitan order, expresses the flexibility of this particular elite.

> "Milner was not really a conservative at all. Milner had an idea - the idea that he obtained from Toynbee and that he found also in Rhodes and in all themembers of his Group. This idea had two parts: that the extension and integration of the Empire and the development of social welfare was essential

to the continued existence of the British way of life, and that this British way of life was an instrument which unfolded all the best and the highest capabilities of mankind." (Quigley (1981:29) *Anglo-American Establishment*

But the group was perfectly capable of forsaking internationalism for reasons of expediency and following 1931 it embraced the model of national economic regulation (Quigley op.cit. 248). The post-imperial order of nation states, welfare and of hegemonic alliances was conceived by the British elite in its period of decline (and in quite conscious manner) and facing increasing global competition. It should be noted that Britains position as workshop of the world in the middle of the 19th Century had been radically reduced by the time of World War I. The turn of the century was a period of declining British hegemony, but also of the more serious fragmentation of other empires, not least, the Habsburgs. That empire was understood as traditionalist, religiously orthodox, rigid and yet its ranks were swelled by a new liberal class of cosmopolitans, many of whom were Jews and who were protected by the imperial court. Thus what might today be considered progressive was then associated with the past, with absolutism, while nationalism was understood as the way of the future. Now while the situation was more complicated than this, since there were other powerful cosmopolitanisms in Europe, the emerging conflict in the world system was spurred on by national competition all of which led to the Great War. The configuration of the period is brilliantly captured in Gellner (1998).

> "Hence the deep irony of the situation: an authoritarian Empire, based on a a medieval dynasty and tied to the heavily dogmatic ideology of the Counter-Reformation, in the end, under the stimulus of ethnic, chauvinistic, centrifugal agitation, found its most eager defenders amongst individualist liberals, recruited in considerable part from an erstwhile pariah group and standing *outside* the faith with which the state was once so deeply identified" (Gellner 1998:12)

This was an arena that plunged into war and strengthened existing nation states as well creating new such entities, and which also established the League of Nations. It was riddled with all of the contradictions referred to above. In the end, however, the cosmopolitan was by and large defeated. In the current situation there are clearly similar tendencies, but political organization seems to have a stronger tendency to empire formation, however fragile. Thus it might appear that cosmopolitan tendencies are on the rise. International organizations, such as the United Nations, especially the most powerful ideological apparatuses, UNESCO, the World Bank and numerous other instances such as the World Economic Forum have all converged on a similar set of representations of global reality. And there is, of course, the interesting heritage of the Rhodes group as hegemony shifted to the United States, one that is visible in post World War II "clubs" such as the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral Commission and the Mount Pelerin society where overlapping membership is strong and which has taken on a more public appearance in recent years in the World Economic Forum in Davos . Global media such as CNN also partake in this ideology which is significant given the force of repetitive imaging and moral framing in the creation of everyday reality, however virtual.[1] It is also significant that a large number of intellectual elites, academics and politicians have

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[1] It is to be noted that CNN viewers are primarily middle class and, in international hotels, even upper middle class.

been socialized into this world view. I have tried to detail the way in which academic anthropology has been influenced by this trend (Friedman 1997, 1999, 2000), partaking in the "postcolonial aura" that celebrates movement in itself as "the good" along with its identities, the transnational, translocal, transsexual, bordercrossing etc. as opposed to dangerous rednecked locals who are associated with nationalism, racism, roots and that greatest of all evils, *essentialism*. This has even become a critique of what is assumed to be the general anthropological perspective, well epitomized in expressions such as the following:

> "..anthropologists' obsession with boundedness is parallelled by the ways in which the people they study try to deal with seemingly open-ended global flows." (Meyer and Geschiere 1999:3)

What a pity that the people we study have got it just as wrong as ourselves. We all obviously are in need of re-education!

It should be noted that cosmopolitanism is not equivalent to internationalism. This is an important distinction that even attracted the attention of Marcel Mauss who defined the former as "deux sortes d'attitudes morales bien distinctes" (Mauss 1920 in 1969: 629). He chose to define cosmopolitanism as a set of ideas and tendencies oriented to the destruction of the nation, while internationalism was merely against nationalism as such but not opposed to the nation state. Thus the socialist internationals struggled with these two concepts and eventually chose the international rather than the cosmopolitan. But there is another difference as well. The cosmopolitanism of the turn of the last century was largely modernist in the legacy of Kant. It identified itself with universal values; moral, rational and scientific. Contemporary cosmopolitanism is the descendent of aristocratic transnationalism discussed above. It is a self-identified status position and one which is quite the contrary of Kantian universalism in that it celebrates and encompasses difference rather than opposing itself to them. This is why the notion of hybridity is a logical consequence of the formation of such identities. The cosmopolitan today is not rationalist-universalist but primarily a fusion of all cultures, captured in the song title "We are the world".

Empire?

The large volume, *Empire,* by Hardt and Negri (2000) is an interesting example of the continuing reinforcement of a particular ideology of the global. This can be found in some of their major thematic statements. There is no question for them that we are entering a post-imperialist world, one expressed by the ending of the Vietnam war, by the disappearance of the Berlin wall and by the globalization of the world economy.   They understand all of this in evolutionary terms even if they are aware of the previous existence of empires and that such structures are themselves fragile in the long run. The main changes that they signal are:

Rhizomatic transformation...equivalent to the development of networks of power replacing state forms
A foucauldian totalization of power its everywhere and nowhere, therefore not in any one hegemonic place such as the US
Openness in the extreme so that there is no longer any outside
The emergence of the nomadic as dominant figure
The formation of a "multitude" to replace the proletariat

According to Hardt and Negri, the United States is the precursor of this development.. Europe is still based on territorially strong national sovereignty while the US has transcended all that. In the US model we already have the tendency to Empire. Unfortunately the Indians had to go as they could never really be *inside*, but the project remains an open one, the frontier that has always to be confronted and transcended and therefore incorporated. This is the self-representation of American pluralism and therefore rings positive for many both right and left who vote for the immigrant nation. Empire is also depicted as an inevitable world evolutionary outcome, which explains the necessity of attacking all cyclical theories of hegemony such as that of G. Arrighi. More consistent with current globalizing ideology is the treatment of the *nomadic* as the wave of the future. The latter is defined as revolutionary whereas the local is relegated to the backward, even harboring a fascist potential. Here is the strongest argument for the globalists..

> "Nomadism and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first
> ethical practices on the terrain of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2000: 362)

While on the other hand,

> "Today's celebrations of the local can be tegressive and een fascistic when
> they oppose circulations and mixture, and thus reinforce the the walls of
> nation, ethnicity, race, people, and the like" (ibid)

Not only do they represent the good and progressive, but their very existence is enough to perform their historical task paving the way for the final revolution of the multitude. None of this is documented, of course, and it could be interpreted as well as a scenario for the ultimate decline of the contemporary imperial order...heralding perhaps a new dark age or feudalism (already inadvertently covered by Appadurai's treatment of new forms of citizenship, i.e. partial membership and cross cutting ties). Where the authors of this book place themselves in all of this is not at all clear, but the totalizing style of the presentation is clearly something that produces resonance.. The book in its 6th printing (several years ago) and has been hailed from many quarters. It is an extraordinary text, praised by reviewers in such disparate places as Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, lauded by authors close to journals like *Public Culture*. The text has a ring of radical chicque perhaps, transcending a number of former perspectives. No longer is there a class issue. The latter is fast becoming a "multitude" whose principle characteristic is its lack of a single unifying identity or strategic goal. The resistence to emergent Empire is simply the essence of all multitude activities since they express projects that are not the dictates of higher powers. The world to come is one that is totalized under Empire in the same sense as globalization is assumed to make the world into a single place. For both, there is no longer an outside. The empire is defined as all encompassing and boundary-less and the multitude are characterized as migrant/nomadic, not because they are forced to be so, but because they are the essence of global desire, the desire to be on the move, to deterritorialize. It is this which makes movement in itself, geographical movement, progressive while immobility is reactionary. The same underlying perspective can be found among globalizers, who see a future in a diasporic world of transnationals (Appadurai, Kelly) who express a higher stage and higher status than the potential rednecked homebodys who make up, in fact, more than 98% of the world's population (so who is on the move one might ask?). Both globalization discourse and *Empire* represent the same set of basic themes.

Empire discourse	*Globalization dicsourse*
The mobile multitude must achieve a global citizenship. The multitude's resistance to bondage—the struggle against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an identity, and a people..and thus the desertion from sovereignty.	We need to think ourselves beyond the nation' (Appadurai 1993:411)
Nomadism and miscengenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethnical practices on the terrain of Empire	"People who move inherit the earth. All they have to do is keep up the good work, 'in search for better opportunity' (Kelly 1999)
Today's celebrations of the local can be regressive and even fascistic when they oppose circulations and mixture, and thus reinforce the walls of nation, ethnicity, race people and the like" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 362)	"That people would gather in a small town in North America to hold a vigil by candlelight for other people known only by the name of 'Indigenous' suggests that being indigenous, native autochthonous, or otherwise rooted in place is, indeed, powerfully heroized" (Malkki op.cit. 59)
	"..anthropologists' obsession with boundedness is paralleled by the ways in which the people they study try to deal with seemingly open-ended global flows." (Meyer and Geschiere 3)

The major difference between the two is that *Empire* includes a more holistic political image of the future than most of the globalization literature, since the latter is almost entirely focused on lateral relations of transmission and movement. Hardt and Negri take on the state and they also reformulate the issue of class relations within their vision. But their totalization partakes of the same logic. This is why Foucault is so important in characterizing power, which is no longer a verticalized relation, but a generalized structure of control. If the multitude threatens this structure it is because it expresses the same properties in essence, openness, nomadism and multiculturism. So perhaps the revolution has already occurred? If the projects of the multitude are an extension of those of empire then we are already home.

There are interesting points of similarity and overlap here between this supposedly radical thinking and cosmopolitan ideology. They can be summarized in the following list.

1968	*1998*
The national	The postnational
The local	The global
Collective	Individual
Social(ist)	Liberal
Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
Monocultural	Multicultural
Equality (sameness)	Hierarchy (difference)

These terms are meant to capture the transition of self-identified progressive thinking over a period of thirty years. These terms form sets of dualist oppositions. They are, of course, oversimplified, but not enough to obscure the nature of the shift. The postnational is today seen as the royal road to the future of mankind whereas the national is a horrible leftover from a nationalist past including essentialist and therefore racist tendencies. The global similarly is an expression of this new nomadic desire to transcend the prison of locality. Individualism as crept into the former collectivist ideology and has manged to associate the latter with Foucauldian totalistic control. Similarly the liberal has successively cannibalized the socialist from the inside, producing a great deal of confusion of the kind expressed in ideologies such as New Labor and contemporary social democracy in general. The heterogeneous has become a goal in itself, a generalized cultural pluralism of different identities, religious and political projects (all based on such cultural identities). This is a paradox in conditions where the advocates of such a position are also liberal individualists since the cultural identities in question are collective. The multicultural quandary is an expression of the same shift toward heterogeneity. The only consistent way out of the contradictions of this position is in the transformation of culture from a structure of existence to a mere role set, so that the individual can practice culture by choice, by elective affinity, like joining the golf club instead of the Wahabists, at least on Monday. In the process of this transition equality is increasingly replaced by hierarchy via an emphasis on difference. This is the key to pluralism as a political form one in which elite rule is essential. Difference becomes the dominant value while equality is seen as an ugly result of totalitarian rule.

It is significant that a work that is so clearly marked by the radical politics of its authors can become a Harvard University Press best seller in the United States, enthusiastically welcomed in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* as by authors connected to *Public Culture*. This book provides a kind of political framework in two ways. It enables the cosmopolitans to reinforce their progressive identities, eliminating the relevance of class and pointing the way to a structure of global power in which the nomadic is defined as the wave of the future revolution. This is a fine piece of ideological fusion, one that is in many ways crucial for the hegemony of the new elites. Lévi-Strauss discussed, in another context, the way in which what he called diametric dualism, egalitarian in form, could be transformed into concentric dualism which which has the quality of being able to represent hierarchy as equality. This is dualism of center and periphery rather than left and right (Fig 3).
In political terms the transition captures a process of hierarchization-centralization that is evident in the recent political evolution in Europe where a former left/right opposition is currently being replaced by what is referred to as the "Third Way" or perhaps more revealing, the German Neue Mitte in which there is a fusion of social democracy and neo-liberal politics, one in which social democracy is the shell and neo-liberalism the core. But similar tendencies were evident in American "New Democracy" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). The

hierarchic and encompassing theme is also expressed in the discourses of international organizations such as UNESCO, to so say nothing of the already mentioned WEF. *Empire* is an uncanny expression of many of these tendencies in globalizing discourse and its ambivalent reference to Foucouldian global governance, without a physical center, but all encompassing, is an excellent concentration of what seems to be "in the air" among certain globalizers. The popularity of the book among certain elites might well be due to the resonance of its message for those who are already tuned in. The relation between globalization, the reconfiguration of class relations and the production of hegemonic representations is both a viable and important subject to which Anthropology, endowed with a clear sense of structural transformation, should be able to contribute. But this cannot be accomplished by the kind of currently popular globalization approaches which are part, in this portrayal, of the reality for which we need to account.

Figure 3

Diametric to Concentric Dualism