Cosmopolitanism in the Black Sea: from imperial Russia to the Stalinist deportations and the post-Soviet diasporas.

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I. Introduction

In 1848, Thomas arrived in Thessaloniki, one of the most important ports of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, especially after the construction of the British, French and Austrian steam lines, which connected the city with other major ports of the Mediterranean (Mazower 2004). Thomas had been born 40 years earlier in another port, Odessa (Black Sea port/Ukraine), within a Greek-speaking family involved in sea trade. His father was the captain of a small commercial boat that was trading between Istanbul and Odessa. Thomas did not have good relations with his father and as soon as he reached adulthood, he went to 'visit' *Zagori*, (western Greece) birthplace of many Greek merchants who traded in the cities that lay at the river coast of Danube. Thomas got involve into trade as well. He owned several mules and he guided the caravans from Zagori to Upper and Lower Danube or Thessaloniki and Istanbul. The development, though, of railways forced him to relocate his business and family back to Odessa, where the opening of the Russian market created new opportunities for trade.

Thomas is the central hero of the second novel of a trilogy by Nikos Themelis, *Anatropi* [Overturn] (2000), a novelist and consultant of the Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis during the period 1995-2004, when the historical and literary interests in the lives of these Greeks were. The book relates the story of a Greek merchant family in late 19th and early 20th centuries. The heroes of the novel live a continuous rooting/uprooting between the Black Sea, mainland Greece and Asia Minor. This specific area represents in the Greek historiography the natural space of Hellenism and the old historical centre of the Greek diaspora.

The 'return' of cosmopolitanism, as a socio-political and academic category was not only a Greek phenomenon. The intensification of international trade, of capital or cultural flows, the development in the technologies of communications, and the increased mobility of various populations led to a revival of the debates concerning cosmopolitanism, often represented as an outcome of the crisis of nation-state. In this framework, Greece, which was founded in 1830s after the combined efforts of the revolted Greeks (Greek Revolution of 1821), funding from the various Greeks diasporas and the diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers (Britain, France, Russia) seemed to have re-discovered its 'diasporas'.

In this paper, I will firstly depict the emergence of these 'cosmopolitan' communities in the 19th century Black Sea, limiting my study to the Greek communities of Georgia with which I spent one year during my fieldwork. Secondly, I will illustrate the shift of the term 'cosmopolitan' in the history of the Soviet Union and how it affected the Greek communities that lived in Soviet Georgia. Finally, I will discuss how the study of diasporas could contribute to the examination of the idea of cosmopolitanism. I will argue that the study of diasporas forces us to ground 'cosmopolitanism' in anthropological research in order to comprehend it. But this 'grounding' often leads us to questions that supersede the 'local' or 'regional' and contribute to a more 'cosmopolitan perspective' (Kuper 1994), in the sense of an open dialogue with other disciplines or social forces, which also try to understand this negotiation.

My paper is based on my fieldwork among the Greek communities of Georgia and the de facto state of Abkhazia (2003-2004). My research concerned the emergence and construction of a 'Greek diaspora' in these regions through memory and practices as well as official discourses. The research was based on narratives concerning family history during the late 19th century until today. These narratives were predominantly centred on various migrations of these families from Turkey to the Caucasus. This paper will first discuss some theoretical issues regarding the idea of cosmopolitanism and diaspora. Second, I will consider the creation of the Greek 'cosmopolitan' communities in Georgia. Thirdly, I will examine how this 'cosmopolitanism' was affected by the creation of Soviet Union leading to the Stalinist purges and deportations. After that, I will examine how cosmopolitanism has emerged in Greek politics in relation to the diaspora in Georgia since 1990s.

II. Some theoretical issues

In this part, I will study some theoretical issues concerning the conceptual relation between cosmopolitanism focusing on the interaction of the latter with the political formation of the period that adopt cosmopolitanism as an ideal. I will start with a reference to the idea of cosmopolitanism, inspired by the ancient philosophy of Stoicism. Then, I will turn to the emergence of cosmopolitanism today, arguing for a study of the historical conditions that often lead to such a discourse and illustrating how the concept of 'diaspora' could highlight the ambiguities of the idea of 'cosmopolitanism'.

a. Cosmopolitans and Citizens in ancient Greece

Voutira (forthcoming 2006) discussing the gradual politicisation of the Greeks from the former Soviet Union since 1990s and the formation of various grassroots organisations illustrates diverse expressions of the relation between Greece and these Greeks based both on the latter's experiences and the Greek nationality laws. In her paper, Voutira underlined that what is often missing from the categories of national membership emerging in the context of the Greek diaspora politics is the Aristotelian idea of *philia,* which suggests a mutual acceptance of the 'self' and the 'other' on equal terms. In other words, whereas these Greeks are considered as ethnically belonging in the Greek nation, they are in practice obliged to deal with a series of bureaucratic and social prejudices that deprive them from an 'equal recognition'. I believe that the concept of *philia* could lead to interesting insights if we compare it to cosmopolitanism, because the former draws our attention to the politics of equality (in terms of economic, political and social justice) that often seem to be marginalised in a discussion concerning the latter.

In Aristotelian ethics (Nikomakhia VIII), we find that ethics and politics are indistinguishable and they both constitute what Aristotle calls philosophy 'about the human affairs' (*peri ta anthropia philosophia*) (Maginas:19). The goal of this philosophy is to study how human beings could reach well being (*ef zin*) and happiness (*efdemonia*). Aristotle analyses in his ethics how this goal could be attained. The key for the achievement of this goal is a life according to human virtues.

Nikomakhia examines which these virtues are. One of them is the concept of *philia*, which connects all human beings to each other (Aristotle Nichomakhia Book VIII). The latter signifies friendship, love, alliance and according to Aristotle, it has various forms of expression. Aristotle describes three forms of *philia*: i) the first is based on interest, ii) the second on lust, and the last one on reciprocity and equality (ibid: chapter 3, 1156[a]).

This last one, which is the most perfect (*telia*) expression of *philia,* can be developed to its purest form *only* among equally and reciprocally recognised human beings, *'telia d' estin i ton agathon philia ke kat' aretin omion'* (the perfect *philia* is found among equal in good and virtue human beings) (Nichomakhia Book VIII, chapter 3, 1156[b]). But where could the conditions of this *philia be* found? For Aristotle *philia* acts as a force of coherence for the cities (*polis)*[1]. But if *philia* constitutes a basic principle for the social life of city-states*,* then, city's members, the citizens (*polites*), are the subjects of Aristotle's quest. In other words, only the citizens of *polis* can fully and truly develop a connection to their equals and this could take place, as, Aristotle believed in democracy in comparison to other political regimes[2]. In this sense, the category human and that of citizen seem to be interwoven, since the latter fulfils the political and moral conditions that Aristotle prescribed as necessary for human completion. On the contrary, the idea of 'cosmopolitan' emerged, as I will show, from the gradual division of the two during the formulation of the ancient empires.

The idea of a citizen of the world, a citizen whose local identity and culture did not prevent her from feeling member of a wider community, humanity, was central in the philosophy of the Stoics. Stoicism came into prominence when the Greek city-state *(polis-kratos*), often identified with the Athenian state of the 5th century BC, had collapsed under the force of the Macedonian attacks from the North. Alexander's empire and later the Roman one which followed, created wider political formations, which expanded far beyond the borders of city-states. In these formations, the idea of

[1] 'eike de ke tas polis synekhin i philia ke i nomothete malon peri aftin spoudazin i tin dikeosinin' (it seems that *philia* clings together the cities and the legislators study more about it than about justice) (Aristotle, Nikomakhia, Book VIII, ch. 1, 1155)

the Athenian citizen (*politi*), an active member of the city, whose direct involvement in the public affairs (*ta kina*) was considered a duty and cornerstone of democracy, was not possible anymore.

In the Hellenistic and Roman world, philosophy came gradually closer to religion since the old gods seemed to have lost their influence on people (Zeller & Nestle 1980: 265-67). Philosophy came out of the more limited and eclectic circles of ancient Greece, trying to provide answers against the moral and social decline by stressing ethics. But as the citizens of the Roman Empire were disappointed by the social and political landscape of their world, they seemed to look answers in an inner world. In this sense, the *cosmos* (order, world order) of that period increasingly became less bounded and more abstract than ancient *polis* since it referred to an inner state where human nature and universal Nature became one.

In this sense, the cosmopolitan of the Stoics became a citizen of *cosmos* when she failed being a citizen of *polis*. In the universe of the Stoics, human nature was part of world order (*cosmos*), which was governed by a universal law or spirit[3] (Clarke 2004: 69-85). As Seneca argued in De vita beata, 'Patriam meam esse mundum sciam et praesides' (my country is the world and its guardians are the gods) (quoted from Baloglou 2005/2006: 120). This universe, which is governed by one Principle was rather compatible with the political system of the Hellenistic and Roman period. Empire and its centralised governance favoured Stoicism and this might be the reason why many Stoics were involved in the Roman public life, such as Marcus Aurelius.

The brief consideration of the historical context that gave rise to the idea of cosmopolitan and the comparison of the latter with other concepts of moral and political consciousness found in Aristotelian philosophy illustrate the embeddedness of cosmopolitanism in the political formations of that period. Cosmopolitanism emerged in Roman years as a moral consciousness that seemed to go beyond human differences by considering this morality as part of an inner world and not as part of

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[2] 'epi mikron di ke en tes tiranisin e philie ke to dikeon, en de tes dimokraties epi plion' (*philiae* is found in lesser degree in the tyrannies, whereas they are found more in democracies) (ibid: ch. 12, $11\beta1^{b}$)

[3] Stoics of different periods uses different terms to describe this universal force that governs the cosmos of the Stoics.

politics. But why does cosmopolitanism as a universalistic project re-emerged in modern period?

2. Modern Cosmopolitanism

As I have shown in my above discussion, cosmopolitanism has emerged in a specific historical context, which tried to answer questions of belonging in the period of formation of the ancient empires when old models of political consciousness seemed inadequate. Today, we are once again at a moment, where specific ideas about formal membership, which had been for centuries cultivated in the European history, seem to be challenged. As Held sketched (ibid: 93), the growth in the number of regional or more international governmental or non-governmental organisations and institutions has cultivated a growing climate of inter-state co-operation, which tries to be effective in the sustenance of the balance of power. This system is supported but also re-generated by the growing interconnectedness in communication technologies, economics and cultures. In these conditions, there is a need for concepts that could go beyond narrow perception of nationhood and statehood.

The need for the conceptualisation of the challenges of globalisation through new analytical frameworks, which could give a way out from more bounded and closed perceptions of collective identity, was expressed in the emergence of *diaspora* and *cosmopolitanism* as categories that could depict the present complexities. Cosmopolitanism is frequently considered within this crisis of nation-state, as an alternative 'intellectual ethic or political project that can better express or embody universalism[4]' (Cheah 1998: 21). The idea owes much to Kant's cosmopolitanism as a 'perfect civil union of mankind' (ibid: 23). Kant's idea emerged at the breaking of the religious, medieval states and the rising of international commerce, which would lead to a universal peace. Kant's vision of 'perceptual peace' is different from the Stoic 'universal law' since it stresses a secular form of cosmopolitanism based on economy and law. Modern ideas of cosmopolitanism continue this tradition depicting the latter as an intellectual end, a *telos* that, when it is achieved, might transcend any expression

[4] A legacy, which owes much to humanism of the Renaissance (Cheah 1998: 22).

of localism. But in this way, cosmopolitanism becomes part of the logocentric legacies of Enlightenment and European modernity[5].

A closer look, though, questions the idea that cosmopolitanism could act as an innate emancipating force from the materialist limitations transcending local differences (ibid: 290: 329). On the contrary, Cheah states that, 'the postcolonial nation-state is always under negotiation in response to a changing globality, and that we cannot calculate absolutely the value of these globali[s]ing processes for the realization of freedom' (ibid: 324). In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not an outcome of the forces of globalization or even a future project. Instead, Cheah argues that we should examine the context that give rise to discourses such as cosmopolitanism, and how they interact with other global or local discourses, a point that I would return after the discussion of my ethnography.

The difficult relation between nation-state and globality might be more clearly depicted in the concept of 'diasporas' as another discourse that tried to transcend the boundedness of the former and embody the latter. Narratives of inclusion and exclusion are crucial to the discussion of diaspora, where the interplay of local, national and international discourses, policies and stereotypes, co-exist. In this sense, the study of diasporas crosses the 'local' in order to particularise it, but also to illustrate its 'transnational moment' (Toloyan 1996: 428). In this way, it is rather difficult to overlook the double-edged nature of diaspora, which tries to balance on both discourses of belonging and mobility. However, diasporas does not always represent a cosmopolitan ethos, expressing often-nationalist agendas and interests.

From this brief discussion, it emerges that both diaspora and cosmopolitanism could bring valuable insights to the discussion of the negotiation between the 'local'/ 'global' not as predefined outcomes but as discourses emerging at given contexts. In this sense, There are limitations in the use of these analytical frameworks. In this paper, I will consider this negotiation in the specific context of the Greek Black Sea

[5] The ideas about 'discrepant cosmopolitanisms' (Clifford 1997) or 'rooted cosmopolitanism' that cannot be analysed in depth in this paper address the problem of the above approach to cosmopolitanism, although I do not think they solve it. The former creates a plurality that risks the danger of annihilating the core idea of one 'moral community', while the latter, although more context-sensitive, translates many different experiences in one main term.

communities and I will discuss how, or if, these analytical categories could express the social and political complexities of these communities, as well as the aspirations of their members. Moreover, if this is not possible, should a new vocabulary be developed and what sort?

III. Greek 'cosmopolitans' before Greece

In this part, I am going to study how the Greek[6] communities of Georgia were formed during the 19th century. There were always migrations between the Black Sea and the Caucasus because of the geography (geographical proximity) and the political economy of the area (imperial interests). But the annexation of Georgia in Russian Empire in 1801 and the Russian-Turkish War of 1827 (1827-1829, Treaty of Andrianople) cultivated the conditions where these migrations took a more 'systematic' character in the 19th century for two main reasons. First, there was a colonial policy[7], which tended to change the demographics of the Caucasus, supporting the arrival of Christian settlers, mostly Greeks and Armenians and the displacement of 'hostile' Muslims, such as the Circassians or the Abkhazians.

For centuries Christianity seemed to have created the matrix upon which the Tsarist diplomacy was based in order to promote its interests in the Caucasus or the Black Sea, opposing the infidel Ottoman Empire. Orthodoxy (*pravoslaviye*) was the most stable factor in Russia's history, whereas the foundation of the vast country, its peasants are simply called *krest'yan,* Christians. This Christian morality seemed to function for the imperial politics of the 19th century as a special character, which differentiated them from the West. Religion became more and more politicised. The

[6] As my research in Georgia has shown, the most desirable designation for the members of these communities is that of 'Greki' (Greeks in Russian) since this was the term used by the Soviet regime to catergorise them as one of the Soviet nationalities. There are several other terms used, depending on the family history, language and interests. The term is used here more as a generic category suggesting reference to a Greek language and culture than to a strict affiliation to the Greek state.

[7] This policy was not such new thing. After the sacking of the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, by the Osmanli-Turks in 1453 there were trends among the Byzantine elite (upper clergy, officers, artists, and *homes des lettres*) to leave the former Christian Empire for western Europe (especially Italy). These contacts started to extend also to Russia in the end of 17th and early 18th centuries, under the rule of Peter the Great (1689-1725) and the efforts of the latter to westernise his vast country and make it the most important Christian power in the region. Peter's last plan became a more organised political practice and imperial policy during the last period of his reign, especially in the 19th century when a significant number of rural populations (Greek and Armenians) arrived in rural areas of central Georgia Hassiotis 1993, 1997).

latter's capitalist ideas of profit were often seen as contrasted to the Russian soul (Dostoyevski 1998, Wachtel 1999). These ideas were predominant in the circles who supported that Russia's natural space was the leadership of the Christian, Slavic, world and not in the West[8]. In this context, Christian settlers, mostly rural families from the Black Sea coast of Turkey (known in the Greek historiography as *Pontos*) were 'invited' by the Tsarist administration to inhabit territories in central Georgia. Their settlement took place when modern techniques of quantification and categorisation facilitated the homogenisation of these communities, as 'Greeks'[9] (Holquist 2001).

Second, the colonial regime promoted economic reforms. The industrialisation and modernisation of the imperial economy affected the migration of the Greeks. The opening[10] of the Black Sea routes and ports created a 'food and raw material dependent economy' on Western Europe (Hobsbawm 2002: 28). The latter contributed to the development of trade. The economic reforms of the Russian Empire motivated Greeks living in the Black Sea coast of Turkey to move to Georgia, mostly merchants or artisans that inhabited the western coast of the country. Trade was considered the driving force behind the prosperity of the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire. Restricted by the Ottoman rule, which did not permit to non-Muslims, other means of economic prosperity, such as feudal property or careers in the Sultan's army, minorities, such as the Greeks were involved in trade. This involvement was supported as well by the already existing Greek communities beyond the Ottoman Empire.

These communities of Greeks were living in various European countries after the sacking of Constantinople by the Osmanli-Turks (1453). The elite of these groups got

[8] However, Christianity was also important for the westernisers, those who supported Russia's position among the western European nations, as a link with the European history.

[9] In this first attempt by the imperial administration to turn the diverse peoples into a countable population, we find a figure of 186,925 Greek-speaking Greeks (105,169 in the southern Caucasus, almost half of them in Georgia) and 20,611 Turkish- and Tartar-speaking Greeks (Agtzidis 1997: 83-85).

[10] Especially after the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi/Kaynarca 1768-1774. This treaty weakened the power of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century permitting all ships flying the Russian flag to more freely cross the Bosphorus straits. Since this treaty European capital started to compete for the Black Sea trade after the Porte lost exclusive control of it, but this competition directly involved the Christian population of the region.

involved in the European Enlightenment in the framework of which 'Hellas'[11] was constructed as the birthplace of European values and spirit. This imagination gave birth to the *New*[12] *Hellenic Enlightenment,* an intellectual movement that lasted almost a century (1700s-1821) and led to the Greek Revolution (1821) and the foundation of the Greek state in 1830s[13]. In this context, heterogeneous groups of 'Greeks'[14] started to claim an ancient Greek heritage (Smith 1999: 78-79, 212-214) and propagate through the development of a Greek-language press the creation of a Greek state (Anonymous 1806). In this sense, these various cosmopolitans in terms of their place of origin, place of residence, occupation began practising the 'imagined community of the diaspora' (Edwards 2003), dreaming the independence of an idealised homeland and defining gradually in relation to this homeland.

In this sense, the transformation of these individuals to a 'Greek diaspora' was rather shaped by the formation of a Greek national movement in 1800s. This movement strengthened the Greekness of these communities and more importantly, attached it to a specific territory. As Hobsbawm (2004: 112-143) underlined, the nation building of this period, 1840s-1870s, made the connection of nations with territory closer and hyphened nationhood with statehood within clearly defined sovereign nation-states. This national feeling grew stronger in the years after the foundation of the Greek state in 1830s (January 22nd/February 3rd, Treaty of London)[15]. A *Hellinisation* project of the diasporic communities of the Black Sea was launched in order to create a homogenous Greek nation in terms of culture and language. The indoctrination of this project was, to great extent, a task of a network of Greek schools, which propagated a

[11] 'Hellas' is how 'Greece' is called in Greek.
[12] New in order to be distinguished by the ancient 'Greek Enlightenment' which refers to the renaissance of the Greek philosophy in the 5th century BC (Zeller and Neste 1980).
[13] In this movement, we could discern many, often-contradictory trends. On the one hand, there were merchant families and intellectuals who stressed the importance of science and secular education. On the other hand, there was the clergy and high rank official of the Ottoman court (Fanariotes) who stressed tradition and religion (Kondilis 1988). A common language, Greek, facilitated the communication of this elite. The latter as language of the Greek Patriarchat of Constantinople, head of all the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire became the language of the educated and mercantile elite.
[14] As Hobsbawm (2002: 174) underlines, 'During the eighteenth century this hellenisation proceeded more powerfully than before, largely because of the marked economic expansion, which also extended the range and contacts of the Greek diaspora'. This hellenisation concerned almost all the educated and merchant families in the Balkans.
[15] As Prevelakis underlines (http://www.trasncomm.ox.ac.uk), the foundation of the Greek state created a new political reality for the until that moment stateless Greek communities: a bounded territorial entity, which was presented as the 'authentic' descendant of the ancient heritage and Byzantine glory.

homogenous national curriculum in Greek language. New teachers and textbooks were sent to Greeks schools functioning in Ottoman Turkey.

At the same time, this Greek project increased the demand for Greek education beyond elite circles. Language seemed to have become the cornerstone of the nation[16]. In the Black Sea communities of the empire in 1860 there were 100 Greek schools; in 1919 1,401 with 85,890 pupils (Lampsidis 1957: 31). Greek press and journals started to circulate among the Greeks of the diaspora. As Augustinos (1992) argues, since 1870s, the printed material of most interest to readers in the diasporic communities were the newspapers, textbooks and other books emanating from Greece[17]. As a result, the young nation-state started to imagine its diasporas as organic part its national body. The last phase of this Hellinisation project targeted the incorporation of these diasporic communities, living in Asia Minor (Aegean coast of Turkey) in the borders of the Greek state. The latter had fatal results for the Greeks of the Black Sea coast of Turkey, who left their birthplace and were forced into exile to Greece or elsewhere, after the defeat of the Greek Army by the Turks in Asia Minor (Greek-Turkish war 1922-1923).

This part has illustrated that there was no uniformity in the expression of 'Greek cosmopolitanism' of the 19th century neither in its sources (Christian ecumenism or economic reforms in the Russian Empire) or the social origin of the groups involved (rural settlers in central Georgia, urban merchant families in western Georgia). Furthermore, it illustrates that 'cosmopolitanism' as an idea emerged as a discourse that propagated the birth first of a nation as an 'imagined community' and then, as a sovereign state. The idea of a Greek homeland, which was constructed under the influence of the ideas of Enlightenment, connected these diverse in terms of social and economic stratification groups with other cosmopolitan Greeks living in Western

[16] The choice of language, however, had its own difficulties. There were debates on which was the proper 'Greek' language: the archaic Greek of the elite or that of the masses, demotic. The language debate or '*glosiko zitima'* (language issue) as it is known in Greece started to perplex intellectual circles after independence.

[17] The press also acquainted their readers with broader European movements, such as Romanticism, which further cultivated the Greek feelings about the homeland, mother-tongue and national identity. From a study of the journal and newspapers that circulated in the Greek communities of Asia Minor, Pontos, Egypt and Cyprus (Papaleontiou 1998: 12-28) in 1880-1930, results that the German and French romantic poets and writers seemed to be the most influential (Haine came first, Baudelaire third).

Europe. It also cultivated the necessary conditions for these groups to imagine themselves in terms of Hellenism (totality of Greeks). Imagining this 'Hellenic (Greek) World' of diverse livelihoods and a common aspiration nurtured these cosmopolitan-Greeks.

The creation of the Greek state transformed these groups into a diaspora with reference to a Hellenic centre, which increasingly acquired the legitimacy and the mechanisms to define Greekness (development of school network, a national curriculum, standardisation of the Greek language). In this sense, the nation started to imagine the diaspora as its reflection. When the turnout of the Greek-Turkish war in Asia Minor uprooted the majority of Greeks from Turkey, the groups who took refuge in Soviet Georgia had to face a complicated situation in terms of their legal status and how the latter was view by the Soviet authorities. In this framework, cosmopolitanism and nationalism seemed to act complementarily. The former rooted in the economic and intellectual trends of the European modernity seemed to imagine the nation as a bounded territory, resulting in the creation of Greece. The latter strengthened the ties among these cosmopolitans. As Thomas' story in the beginning of this paper has illustrated, this Greek merchant from Odessa seemed to consider this 'Hellenic World' as a space where he felt 'at home' and did not hesitate to seek for new opportunities for his trade. The creation of Greece and the Hellinisation project started to imagine this space in terms of territory and sovereignty ending with fatal result for the Greek communities of the Black Sea.

IV. Cosmopolitanism as a threat

The Greek-Turkish war, as I have discussed, created waves of refugee form Pontos towards the Caucasus increasing the already existing numbers of Greek living in Georgia. As a result, the Greek who lived in Georgia in 1920s was far from a homogenous group due to the time of their arrival and the degree of their embeddedness in the former Tsarist economy and society. On the one hand, there were the people who had migrated in Georgia during the 19th century. Many of them were subjects of the Tsar and had an imperial citizenship (*grazhdanstvo*). After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the formation of the Soviet Union, many of them became also holders of Soviet passports. On the other hand, there were the refugees

from the Greek-Turkish war, who according to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), signed with the end of the war in order to regulate the problems between the two countries, granted Greek citizenship to all the Greek refugees from Turkey. Applying the Treaty's terms, however, to all refugees was difficult because of the geographical and demographic complexities arising from the new borders in the southern Caucasus. As a result, stateless people with no legal status and affiliation to an imperialist country, like Greece, found themselves in an awkward situation. Suspicions arose about their loyalties.

These suspicions were not unrelated to the Bolshevik ideas about nations. After many contradiction concerning the Lenin's stance towards the idea of nation, the Bolshevik leaders[18] in 1920s believed that enhancing national cultures would postulate the difference of their own ideology in comparison to that of the former Tsarist regime. Moreover, this policy would develop the support of the peoples, which constituted the Soviet Union to the Bolshevik ideals. In this context, Greek language school started to function and a new generation of Greek language teachers were trained in Georgia. The strengthening of national belonging covered by the Marxist ideology deepened the feeling of Greekness to Greeks found in Georgia and were discerned by various degrees of Hellinisation with more Hellinised those who arrived in Georgia in 1900s.

But if rooting in national republics, such as Georgia, was taking place in under the auspices of the Soviet regime, cosmopolitanism was considered with hostility. As Cheah underlines (1998) Marxist ideas of cosmopolitanism creative an new interpretative horizon for the latter in the 19th century Europe. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (Marx K. & Engels F. (1983) [1848]) argued that the formation cosmopolitanism was becoming part of the bourgeois exploitation of the

[18] Following Marx's ideas about nations, Lenin considered them in his early writings, as a pathogen of the bourgeois societies used to control the means of production and obstruct the working class alliances. In 1913, Stalin in his 'Marxism and the National Question' (1953: 300-382), expressed the official Bolshevik line on the issue arguing that the nation was a historical formation whose existence should not be denied but which was far less important than class. However, after the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War that lasted until 1921, the reactions of already existing nations of the former Russian Empire obliged Lenin to reconsider his stance. He started to believe in the instrumentality of nations as a form of creating solidarity, especially when the expression of these national feelings was oppresed by the Tsarist regime and his plan of Russification. In this framework, he shaped his ideas about the nationalism of the oppressed people, which were favoured by the Bolsheviks as emancipating and that of the oppressors that were castigated. This framework affected his project of national

world resources and the creation of a world market system (Marxists Internet Archive http: //www.marxists.org/archive/works, Communist Manifesto)

> The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.

In addition, Marx and Engels often ridiculed these bourgeois cosmopolitans in order to expose their moral decadence. In the 'Heroes of the Exile', a satirical pamphlet published by in 1852 (Marxists Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/works/1852/heroes-exile/ch13.htm, Heroes of the Exile) the leaders of the South German émigrés are characterised as 'lacking in any definite commitment' and having a high degree of opportunism: 'the general mob of ***émigrés is*** [their emphasis] put into barracks either at government expense (..) or by either other means'. At the same time, though, Marxism was proposing a new world order, which was transcending local particularities: working class revolution. How was the latter going to be achieved? The Bolshevik experiment with the creation of the Soviet Republics illustrated that the idea of nation was increasingly considered a valuable instrument in the creation of a truly Communist society. That first period of Greeks living in Soviet Georgia is an example of this ideology.

However, when the Soviet realism[19] during Stalin's leadership (since 1929) propagated that the formative period of national awareness of 1920s had been successful, a new target was set. Stalin began launching an increasingly more centralised and totalitarian system both in terms of economy (collectivisation) and politics (purges against the intellectuals and Party members since 1937). The most frequently used accusation against the people, who were persecuted, was that of the 'enemy of the people', often identified as 'stateless cosmopolitans'. This accusation was used widely not only for political 'enemies' of Stalin, but also for anyone who seemed, according to the regime's standards, ill-suited, taking more and more and

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awareness and development that was launched in 1920s in the Soviet Republics, as part of '*korenizatsiya*' (rooting) in order to create a new social and political order.

[19] The term refers mainly to the art forms of the Stalinist period, which brought o an abrupt end the Russian avant-guard of the early 20th century. Soviet Realism was supposed to depict the Soviet reality as a truly socialist one illustrating the anonymous Soviet people (workers, Kolkhoz farmers). In this war, the Soviet realist art, instead of depicting a reality, it created one propagating the Party's lies regarding the achievement of the regime.

ethnic turn especially since the World War II, with the deportation of various ethnic minorities, such as the Chechens. As a result, in 1949 almost all the Greeks living in western Georgia were deported to Kazakhstan[20].

The deportations did not touch all the Greeks. In fact, families who managed to escape the Stalinist terror, sometimes for no obvious reasons, remember the post-Stalinist period in terms of education and career prospects as fruitful. At least in theory, Soviet citizenship offered the Greeks in Georgia full membership and access to all the state benefits. In other words, while they were persecuted as 'cosmopolitans', they were compensated as one of the Soviet nationalities. In the following vignette, I am presenting Giorgi's memories of that period. He was born in Tbilisi from Greek parents who had arrived in Georgia in the 19th century. Giorgi graduated from the State University of Tbilisi and then, he went for postgraduate studies in the prestigious University of Moscow[21]. Later he worked as an engineer in Siberia, South Russia, in the Urals and in Georgia. Giorgi even now, when he compares his life today in Georgia with that under the Soviet regime, seems nostalgic[22].

'Ah! Papers and visas… In the years of the Soviet Union when we had Stalin, we could travel from Tbilisi to Sakhalin, you know, near Japan, without a visa, without anything. What you are trying to achieve with the European Union we already had it back in those days'

A new cosmopolitanism seemed to emerge for Soviet citizens like Giorgi, by the formation of the Soviet Union, which is often neglected. Although Marx, as I depicted above, castigated bourgeois cosmopolitanism, he propagated the development of a new world alliance based on the working class revolution. In this ideological

[20] Approximately 40,000 Greeks from the Caucasus were deported in 1949, mainly from Georgia (Conquest 1972, Pohl 1999). The Greeks from Crimea and southern Russia (Krasnodar, Rostov) had already been sent into exile in 1942 and in 1944. The reasons for the deportations are still debated among the Greeks of Georgia. The most popular cause, though, seems to be the Greek passports that many of the Greek families living in Georgia still owned. As my fieldwork has shown, this ambiguity in terms of the reasons of the deportation increased the feelings of powerlessness and sustained the terror that the regime provoked.

[21] For example many students arrived for studies in Moscow in the same period like Giorgi from African or South East Asian states that had pro-Communist regimes.

[22] Of course, mobility in the Soviet territory was highly controlled by the authorities with the use of internal passports for the Soviet citizens and the residence permit.

framework, a Communist ecumene seemed to emerge in 1960s and 1970s among the various Communist regimes, with Moscow playing a leading role. This ecumene did not limit itself only to the satellite states of Eastern Europe but expanded to many newly independent from western colonialism African or Asian states[23], which had different degrees of political or economic dependency on Moscow in the context of the gradual polarisation of the world because of the Cold War.

This Cold War did not permit Giorgi's father, who had family in Greece[24], to have any kind of communication with them since 1920s when the family split up. When Giorgi was studying in Moscow, though, he found out that a member of this part of his family was also in the Soviet Union. Regina, Giorgi's cousin, had arrived with her parents, who had been involved in the Greek Communist Party, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After the Greek Civil War, 1945-1948, many Greek Communists were forced into 'exile' in order to escape the concentration camps or the death penalty in Greece[25]. Regina, was studying in the same faculty, as Giorgi.

As Giorgi's story illustrates, in the post-war period (World War II) a process of gradual sealing the borders and wiping out the 'difference' was undertaken in both sides of 'Iron Curtain'. Conditions of polarisation were developed in Greece after the World War II and were accentuated by the Civil War. These conditions led to the political persecution of those who were belonging in the communist ideology, such as Regina's case illustrates. Greece had its own 'enemies of the people'. These exiled groups often provided the Greeks already living in the Soviet camps with 'new blood' renewing often the links of the former with the 'homeland'. For example, many newly arrived Greek Communists became Greek language teachers in the camps.

In this part, I have discussed the shifts in the ideas of cosmopolitanism after the revolution of 1917, which formed new realities not only in the Soviet Union. The gradual polarisation between the 'West' and 'East' created a new interpretative

[23] In my fieldwork, I registered the stories of many professor of Tbilisi State University, who during that period, taught Russian to students from various African or South East Asian states (Algeria, Vietnam, Laos).
[24] After the defeat of the Greek army in Turkey, this branch of Giorgi's family managed to arrive in Greece as refugees.
[25] Some historians present the defeat of the Greek Communists in this war as the reason for the deportation of the Greeks of Georgia, which I rather find a remote chance.

horizon for cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Nations were considered as the natural space of belonging in the post-war political landscape. Nation-states were sealing its borders to 'difference'. New exiles emerged. New categories, such as that of the 'enemies of the people' both for the Greeks living in Georgia and those in Greece were shaped, although their meaning was attached to the ideological affiliation of each side. At the same time, new forms of conceptualising a world beyond nation-states seemed to emerge. Both 'West' and 'East' searched for new formations that imagined the world beyond the borders of nation-states both in terms of institutionalised politico-economic formations (E.U., NATO, COMECON) resulted to new forms of mobility. For example new waves of Greek migrants left Greece in order to work in Germany in the period of the post-war reconstruction[26] (Hassiotis 1993). Similarly, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, mobility, such as Giorgi's case has illustrated, was continued creating or renewing the population of older diasporas. In this political context, it seemed that humanity more than an expression of a 'moral community' became an ideology. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1990/1991 changed this situation.

Conclusion: The New Greek Cosmopolitanism?

As I have discussed until now nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the case of these Black Sea communities were not necessarily opposing each other. Instead, the cosmopolitan Greeks used the verve and geographical expansion of their communities in order to disseminate the national idea. At the same time, the Greek nationalism gave to these cosmopolitans, at the period before the foundation of Greece, a new force in their communication. The creation of the Greek statehood and then, the formation of the Soviet Union increased the suspicions against people who did not have legal status. My discussion in the last part underlined that the sealing of borders against 'difference' aimed at increasing of state power. However, mobility in various forms was not ceased neither in 'West' nor in the 'Iron Curtain', resulting in new diasporas and new forms of cosmopolitanism in the years that followed. The fall of

[26] As Hassiotis (1993) illustrated many of the refugees who arrived from Asia Minor and the Black Sea in 1920s in Greece because of the poor economic situation of the latter left the country in order to

the Soviet Union reshaped the geopolitics in this region and brought these Greeks in contact with the 'historical homeland'. In this part, I will show how these changes gave rise to new imageries of the past, where the concept of diaspora became eminent. I will also illustrate how the idea of cosmopolitanism becomes part of the Greek diaspora politics.

In 1990s, the role of Greece, as a western 'fortress' in the midst of the Communist Balkans seemed to diminish in importance after the end of the Cold War, without although decreasing the country's dependency on the western political formations, such as the E.U. or NATO. In addition, the political and economic landscape of the world changed giving rise to a new assessment and imagination of the past. As Shami (2000: 199) argues '[g]lobalisation has produced new flows that open up the potential for new imaginations and memories'. However, 'new' here does not necessarily mean less nationally deterministic. In this context, 'forgotten' or 'forbidden' because of the Cold War diasporas, such as the Black Sea communities, which belonged in the sphere of the Iron Curtain were 're-discovered'. The Greek diaspora of Georgia seemed to be considered as a bridge between Greece and the Caucasus, a region with special interest in the new geopolitics because of its proximity to the natural resources (oil, gaz) of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. This 'bridge', therefore, could put Greece back on the map of the post-Cold War geopolitics.

A new platform of organisation of the Greek diasporas was founded in a more instutionalised manner. Central part of this plan was the creation of the 'World Council of Hellenes Abroad' (hereafter SAE) (http://www.sae.gr) in 1995. The SAE is the umbrella organisation of all the Greek grassroots. The founders of the SAE felt that the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and changes in international politics opened up a window for the re-activation of Greek cosmopolitanism. The latter referred to the old communities of 'omogenon' (people of the same lineage) that could help all Greeks benefit from this new world order. The SAE is a non-governmental organisation, whose mission statement emphasises (http://www.sae.gr):

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migrate to the Americas: the USA and various countries of South America, Argentina, Brazil. Similarly, after the World War II anew wave of migrations started in Greece.

- re-unification of the Hellenic world and promotion of Hellenism in order to bolster lobbying power
- economic, social and political strengthening of the Greeks abroad, especially the more vulnerable ones
- motivating all Greeks abroad to contribute to and participate in the SAE

The general term 'Hellenism', as I have discussed earlier in this paper, lumped together diverse populations with different histories and experiences. It is obvious from its mission statement that the SAE is greatly concerned with the political agendas of the Greek state. Its first goal is lobbying. As a result, diaspora is often considered a subdivision of Hellenic culture produced and defined by the national centre. Since the SAE fails to define Hellenism, the Greek state has the exclusive privilege of doing so. As a result, I believe that in this context, diaspora is considered as a national capital rooted in the past of the Greek nation and is re-activated on a transnational arena defined by global politics and economics as well as the position of Greece within the latter.

Various cultural centres studying and promoting the 'Black Sea Hellenism' seemed to flourish following an increasing academic and literary interest on the region since 1990s. The 'Centre for the Study and Development of the Hellenic Culture of the Black Sea' was founded in 1996. In one of the pamphlets published for their activities they state that the centre's aim is the 'documentation and study of the historical trajectory of Hellenism from the first settlers in the Black Sea region to the adventures of the recent past'. In this way, they stress the continuity of Greek presence in the region of Black, in the name of which they justify their action. The pamphlet also wishes to contribute to 'the strengthening of these Hellenic Communities' links with the metropolis' since the post-Soviet conditions demand that the centre nurture more stable communication with and cultural feedback from the 'other Greeks'. In this way, the Centre emphasises the Hellenic nature of these communities without referring to their 'cosmopolitan' character.

As Hannerz argues (1990: 245) that, different transnational cultures relate in different ways to 'opportunities to cosmopolitanize'. It seems that these opportunities for Greece are based on privileging and idealising moments of the past that refer to a

moment that statehood for the Greeks was either an aspiration or very loose. The 'Hellenic World' within which these cosmopolitan Greeks lived and often thrived did not have a centre. These Greeks claimed a Greek heritage and often communicated in Greek though multilingual, because of the Greek Church. They tried to adjust to the conditions they were living, got profited from them, and were inspired by them in order to imagine the creation of Greek homeland. As I have discussed, at that moment they began to act as a 'diaspora' and define themselves in relation of a bounded territory. Greece as 'historical homeland' emerged as the 'natural' expression of the nation's continuity through time and space after the foundation of the Greek state in 1830s. This idea, I have shown, was strengthened through the Hellenisation project of 1900s. Memories of the Greek homeland was fostered in the family history of the Greeks in Georgia and were also reinforced by the conditions cultivated by the Soviet policies, such as, the development of national awareness in 1920s, deportations and the rising nationalism in post Soviet Georgia[27].

Today, the reference to this 'Hellenic World', though, in the framework of the Greek diaspora politics often overlooks the fact that this 'cosmopolitan' vision did nto have Greece at its centre (political or economic). The economic plight of these Greeks living in Georgia turned them to a great extent dependable on the funding from the Greek state through the various humanitarian progammes managed by the Greek grassroots functioning in Georgia and through the remittances from Greek-Georgian migrants living in Greece. When waves of Greek descent migrants arrived in Greece in the 1990s, questions of national membership entered everyday discussions and led to a fresh reading of Greek history and the category of Greekness.

The category of 'omogeni'[28], used in diaspora politics to designate people of the same lineage/blood, gives Greeks from Georgia the right to apply automatically for a Greek

[27] In 1987, 527 persons returned from the Soviet Union**.** In 1988 1,365, in 1989 6,791 and in 1990 13,863 (Vergeti 1994, Agtzidis 1997, Tinguy 2003). The Greeks were no exception. A similar but more intense pattern of migration is found among the other non-indigenous nationalities of the Soviet Union, the Jews and the Germans, because of their numbers (Münz & Ohliger 2003).

[28] As Tsitselikis (2005: 7) argues, the authorities have to verify on an individual basis whether someone is an 'omogenis'. They take into account their origin (maternal or paternal lineage), language, participation in grassroots organisations and the type of activities carried out by these. In this framework, proving one's Greekness become a complicate business that often alludes, as my fieldwork has illustrated, to organised strategies of identification and ingenuity (genealogies, material culture, bribery).

citizenship. This based on blood affiliation distinguishes these migrants from other ethnically different migrant groups living in Greece. As a result, in this re-emergence of the ideal of the 'Hellenic World', cosmopolitanism is constructed in the framework of diaspora politics motivated rather by national interests. The latter often result in strict definitions of Greekness that seem to exclude Greek descent Georgians, for example the Turkish-speaking Greeks from central Georgia (Tsalka). However, as I will show below, the adherence to this official Greek identity that an application for Greek citizenship might involve, frequently is part of a strategy. In this way, people, like Giorgi could cope with the economic and political conditions of globalisation in order to enhance their personal or family chances.

In this political framework, Giorgi in Georgia plans his future and that of his children: 'I am planning to send my son to Greece this summer to learn the language and if it is possible, to study there or in Germany where we also have relatives. My daughter had already visited Greece. She is a Greek language teacher'[29]. As I found out in my return trip to Georgia, Giorgi's son got a SAE scholarship to study in the USA. Giorgi believes that if things go well, he might send his daughter to California as well, because he thinks that there are more opportunities in the United States than in Greece. 'Greece is my homeland and it is beautiful for the summer, but life is tough there for us. There are no jobs', he states.

As Giorgi's plan shows, Greece is not put at the centre of Giorgi's plans, as *the metropolis*, the centre of all the Greeks, diasporic or not. In the same way, the SAE is considered as an opportunity for Giorgi to open new perspectives for his children, perspectives that transcend the borders of the metropolis and connect Giorgi and his family to other Greek communities, formed in different periods of the Greek history. Giorgi's Greekness does not seem to limit itself to Greece as nation-state and the latter's agendas, as it is often the case in the Greek diaspora politics, where diaspora is considered a vehicle for nation-state to imagine itself on a cosmopolitan perspective. But for Greeks like Giorgi, there is a plurality of approaches to the 'homeland' that are often interwoven.

[29] As his daughter told me, she planned to return to Greece when Georgia, according to the new president's declarations accept the dual citizenship.

On the one hand, people, like Giorgi, want to get to know the land of the stories of their parents, their 'motherland'. Giorgi has sent both of his children to Greece to learn the language and visit their relatives. On the other hand, there is the instrumental use of an official 'Greek' identity that opens the door for work and residence in a well-off country, like Greece during a difficult period for Georgia. At the same time, this Greek citizenship, as part of wider political formations, such as the E.U. gives the opportunity for other forms of mobility in other E.U. countries or the USA, according to the needs of each family and the economic demands of the new world order. For example, Giorgi balances carefully the pro and cons of the job market in Greece and that in the USA. These new forms of mobility create new diasporas, such as Greek-Georgian diaspora. For example, his son who lives in the United States has developed a network of friends both among the Greek and the Georgian migrants in the States. A new Greek-Georgia diaspora, which has as a place of origin Georgia and not Greece, seems to emerge. How the latter is going to be represented within SAE and its agendas is a new challenge.

As this paper has illustrated, a diaspora discourse in Greece could not often express the various perceptions of belonging and mobility, home and diaspora; local and global found in the stories the Greeks of Georgia, like Giorgi. These stories demonstrate how the memories of these people seek out new roots, routes or expressions of their experiences. As a result, the relation between the Greeks living in Georgia and Greece, both as a state and as an imagined homeland, cannot be described only through the terms 'nation' and 'diaspora'. A broader perspective is necessary in order to grasp more fully the connections and interactions between the 'local' and 'global'. Could this perspective be found in 'cosmopolitanism'? I do not believe that a definition of cosmopolitanism in terms of a moral community that could embody universalism is adequate to express Giorgi's case, which illustrates that Giorgi's family needs oblige him to plan his future in transnational terms.

However, Giorgi's transnationalism does not envisage the world in terms of a moral community. Even the translation of Giorgi's case in the framework of the Greek diaspora politics as part of a 'Hellenic World' seems to overlook Giorgi's own translation of his homeland not as a final, almost metaphysical destination. Giorgi's case rather underlines the latter's need to act on this transnational horizon created by

world politics and economics in such a way that neither himself nor his children would be marginalised, as it is often the case for these transmigrants both in Greece or anywhere else. In this context, Giorgi does not feel more cosmopolitan today that he used to be during the Soviet years, when he felt that his Soviet citizenship could guarantee full citizen's rights for him and his family, such as social justice and welfare, even if they are remembered today through the lenses of nostalgia. The longing for these rights defines Giorgi's belonging and his mobility.

In this sense, Giorgi draws our attention not to cosmopolitanism, as a sort of a universal community that transcends difference, but to the conditions where Giorgi's 'difference' does not condemn him to marginalisation of any sort. As my paper has discussed, cosmopolitanism always (re)-emerged as an ideal strongly connected to political systems and economies that needed to go beyond bounded political entities (the ancient empires, post-Westphalean Europe and the emergence of capitalism). In all these periods, cosmopolitanism seemed to constitute a source of inspiration in order to improve the living conditions (the decline of the Hellenistic world, Kant's perceptual peace, the Communist utopia as a rejection of the bourgeois cosmopolitanism). In all these moments, cosmopolitanism had to interact with local aspirations, that often seemed incompatible to the cosmopolitan ideal, such as the Greek national movement of the 19th century I discussed in this paper.

I believe that the re-introduction of cosmopolitanism as an 'open ended ideal' (Butler 1996) might be legitimate only as an appeal to ethics that is often missing from our political and economic frameworks of analysis. However, a careful examination of what shape this 'ideal' takes or when it is invoked is necessary in order to depict how it is connected to various economic and political interests or cultural histories, as the case of the Greek diasporas of Georgia has illustrated. Giorgi's case underlines his need to become not a citizen of the world, but a citizen with full citizen's rights. In this sense, Giorgi alludes less to the *cosmos* of the Stoics and more to *polis*, as a political formation that guarantees social justice and equality to its citizens. He refers to a world that the category 'human' and that of 'citizen' would be used interchangeably as forms of similar moral and political meanings. However, until that moment, our ethnographies, and especially the study of diasporas could bring

valuable insights of how the negotiation between the 'local' and the 'global', of culture, economics and politics take place and how this negotiation concerns us all.

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